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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
can be demonstrated by the defendant, however, the decision will stand
as a reflection of the currently prevailing application of the demand-
waiver rule.
FRANK F. ARNESS
Juvenile Courts-PROPER QUANTUM OF PROOF IN JUVENILE HEAR-
INGS. In re Sanuel Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
The appellant was found to be a delinquent child' in juvenile court
proceedings, and was placed in a training school. The child's commit-
ment was upheld by the Court of Appeals of New York,2 and an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. The appellant
urged that his commitment be reversed on the ground that his right of
due process was violated by the New York statute which allowed a
declaration of delinquency to be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence,3 rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme
Court, in reversing, extended the meaning of due process in juvenile
proceedings involving a violation of criminal law by requiring that the
alleged act be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.4
The juvenile court system as it exists in most states today is regarded
as a vehicle for the rehabilitation of delinquent youths rather than as a
means of punishment.5 The proceedings are of a non-criminal nature,6
and therefore many of those rights which would be guaranteed the
juvenile if he were tried in a criminal court for the same offense have
1. "'Juvenile Delinquent' means a person over seven and less than sixteen years of
age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." N.Y.
JUDICIARY-FAMmY COURT Acr § 712(a) (McKinney 1963).
2. W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N2E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).
3. "Any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a respondent
did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence." N.Y. JUDICIARY-
FAMmY CoURT Acr § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).
4. In re Samuel Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
5. "As originally conceived, the juvenile court was to be a clinic not a court; the
judge and all of the attendants were visualized as white-coated experts there to
supervise, enlighten and cure-not to punish." DeBacker v. Brainard, 90 S. Ct. 163, 167
(1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See In re Poulin, 100 N.H. 458, 129 A.2d 672 (1957);
In re Rich, 125 Vt. 373, 216 A.2d 266 (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1970).
6. Most state statutes establishing juvenile court systems provide that the proceedings
are to be non-criminal in nature. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.10(3) (1961); GA. CoDE
ANN. § 24-2418 (1959); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 260.21 (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-65
(1953).
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been denied him.7 Foremost among these rights is the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support a determination of guilt.8
The Supreme Court's involvement in the area of due process in juvenile
hearings has been limited.9 In Kent v. United States ,1° the Court held that
juveniles are entitled to due process in those proceedings which may
result in their institutionalization on grounds of alleged misconduct
which, if committed by an adult, would be criminal in nature. In re
Gault" reaffirmed the necessity of due process, and expressly included
four rights which were considered to be essential to due process.12 In
both opinions, however, the Court stated that it was not requiring that
juvenile proceedings conform to all due process requirements of a
criminal proceeding.3
The opinions of the Supreme Court indicate that it has long been
assumed that the Constitution requires a criminal charge to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.14 The instant case explicitly extends this
requirement to juvenile delinquency proceedings.15 Gault, therefore,
now includes the reasonable doubt standard as many had predicted it
eventually would. 6
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted that the Winship de-
cision will
not (1) interfere with the worthy goal of rehabilitating the juve-
nile, (2) make any significant difference in the extent to which a
7. See Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRNFW. L. REv. 387
(1961).
8. Only two states, Illinois and Maryland, have statutory provisions which require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile hearings. ILL. ANx. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-4
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-18(a) (Supp. 1969).
9. Some observers feel that the Court has already gone too far and has destroyed
the most valuable element of the juvenile system, lack of procedural strictness. In re
Samuel Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1078-79 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
10. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
11. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
12. The rights which were held to be essential to due process in Gault were: proper
notice, id. at 33; right to counsel, id. at 41; privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 55;
and the right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, id. at 56.
13. Id. at 30; 383 U.S. at 562.
14. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United States, 348
U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895);
Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880).
15. 90 S. Ct. at 1075.
16. See, e.g., Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and
Reappraisal, 53 VA. L. REv. 1700 (1967).
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youth is stigmatized as a "criminal" because he has been found to
be a delinquent, or (3) burden the juvenile courts with a proce-
dural requirement which will make juvenile adjudications signifi-
candy more time consuming or rigid.17
The cautious manner in which the Court is proceeding into the area
of juvenile rights at hearings indicates that it recognizes the beneficial
aspects of the present juvenile court system as well as its need for im-
provement. The Couri seems determined to preserve those aspects of
the juvenile hearing which it considers necessary for rehabilitation while
at the same time providing the safeguards of criminal procedure which
it considers essential to due process.
DENNIS L. BECK
Products Liability-BREACH-OF WARRANTY-DANGER INViTEs RES-
cu.. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d
173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
Plaintiffs in this case were employees, and the survivors of employees
of the New York City Bureau of Sewage Disposal who had been in-
jured or killed in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue John J. Rooney'
from a sewer tunnel filled with lethal hydrogen sulfide gas. Rooney
was suffocating and in need of aid because of a defect in the gas mask
he was wearing in the tunnel.2 The mask had been manufactured by
the defendant.
The rescuers or their survivors sought damages for wrongful death
and personal injuries. The trial court found the manufacturer liable;
the Appellate Division' and Court of Appeals of New York affirmed.4
The Court of Appeals held the manufacturer liable to the rescuers under
17. 90 S. Ct. at 1078.
1. Rooney's estate recovered in a previous action for wrongful death. Rooney v.
S. A. Healy Co., 20 N.Y.2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 383, 281 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1967).
2. Rooney was wearing a used mask. Id. at 46, 228 N.E.2d at 386, 281 N.Y.S.2d at
325. See Kaufman v. Katz, 356 Mich. 354, 97 N.W.2d 56 (1959); UNIFORM COMMCIAL
CODE § 2-314, Comment 3. Contra Holley v. Central Auto Parts, 347 S.W.2d 341
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (the court held that the doctrine of implied warranty does not
extend to used goods).
S. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 255, 297 N.Y.S.2d 639
(1969).
4. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306
N.Y.S2d 942 (1969) (the actions of all the rescuers were consolidated).
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